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I. INTRODUCTION: FRAUD AT THE COMMON LAW
In the years prior to the enactment of the Securities Act of 19331
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 fraud in the purchase and sale
of securities was governed by the principles applicable to the common law
action of deceit; unless the fraudulent transaction fell within the confines
of some other federal statute which only coincidentally touched transac-
tions in securities.3 To the extent that the concept of "fraud" under the
Acts of 1933 and 1934 could not have been born in a vacuum and must
have been conceived with an eye to the principles governing at the com-
mon law, a brief inspection of those concepts must be undertaken.
In order to state a cause of action for deceit at common law, the
plaintiff was required to allege and prove the following:' (1) a false
representation of a material5 fact made by the defendant; (2) scienter,
or knowledge on the part of the defendant that his statement was false,
or at least the absence of a sufficient basis of information on which to
* Member of the Florida Bar; formerly, Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law
Review; Student Instructor for Freshmen, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Exchange Act].
3. Thus, for example, one who through the use of the mails fraudulently induced the
purchase or sale of a security would be subject to criminal liability under the general mail
fraud statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1940).
For a sampling of cases wherein securities transactions were held to involve the mail
fraud provisions, see the following: United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948);
Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied 291 U.S. 674 (1934);
Stephens v. United States, 41 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 880 (1930);
United States v. Hersey, 288 Fed. 852 (D. Mass. 1923); Pandolfo v. United States, 286
Fed. 8 (7th Cir. 1922), cert. denied 261 U.S. 621 (1923).
4. See generally PROSSER, TORTS 523 (2d ed. 1955).
5. A fact may be defined as "material" if "its existence or nonexistence is a matter
of which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his course of action
in the transaction in question." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 538(2) (1934).
Under the Exchange Act, the term "material" is limited to "those matters as to which
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make it;' (3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
acting in reliance on the statement; (4) justifiable reliance upon the
statement on the part of the plaintiff; 7 and (5) damage to the plaintiff
as a consequence of his reliance.
The scope of the protection available under the common law was
set forth in the leading case of Peek v. Gurney.' In that case, the directors
of a corporation issued a false prospectus for the purpose of inducing the
public to purchase stock from the corporation. In denying recovery to
an investor who had purchased the stock on the open market and not
from the individual defendants directly, the court limited responsibility
to those persons whom the defendants had intended to induce. Although
Peek v. Gurney has been accepted by the Restatement of Torts,9 and
at the present time still appears to be the majority view, recent years have
witnessed a tendency away from the traditional view and towards the
extension of liability to those persons whose reliance on the representation
might reasonably have been anticipated.' Even under the traditional
view, however, strict privity of contract between the parties does not
seem to be a requisite. On the other hand, to the extent that direct privity
wanes in importance, the element of reliance upon the false representa-
tion would seem to wax more significant, especially in the case where the
only nexus between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's
injury is the latter's reliance on the false statement. As will be seen later,
the two concepts of privity and reliance pose important and still not
fully resolved issues under the federal statutes."
Finally, under the traditional common law view of deceit, a cause
of action would lie only in the case of affirmative untruths on the part of
the defendant. Under the more modern common law theory, an action for
an average prudent investor ought reasonably be informed before buying or selling the
security . . . " Sec. Exch. Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1964). The same
meaning prevails under the Securities Act. Sec. Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1964).
6. For a more comprehensive treatment of the intent necessary to result in liability,
see PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 537-49.
7. Generally, the requirement of justifiable reliance is closely tied to the requirement
that the fact misrepresented be a material one. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 554.
The fact that the plaintiff might have ascertained the falsity of the representation by
an investigation is not inconsistent with reliance on its truth. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 540
(1934). However, actual knowledge by the plaintiff that the representation is false precludes
a finding of reliance. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 538, comment (c) (1934). Similarly, if the
falsity of the representation is obvious, reliance will not be considered justified. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 541 (1934).
8. L.R. 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 377 (1873).
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 531 (1934).
10. These cases have dealt with representations involved in various kinds of docu-
ments: e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849 (1945)
(negotiable instrument) ; National Bank v. Kershaw Oil Mill, 202 Fed. 90 (4th Cir. 1912)
(bill of lading); Baker v. Hallam, 103 Iowa 43, 72 N.W. 419 (1897) (deed); Merchants'
Nat'l Bank v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 Pac. 985 (1892) (stock certificate); Stickel v. At-
wood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 Atl. 687 (1903) (bond). See also PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 540.
11. See section V(C) of this paper's text, infra.
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deceit also encompasses a half-truth, which is held to be as much a mis-
representation as if the facts stated were untrue. 2 However, even today
there is no common law liability for complete nondisclosure, unless one
party to a business transaction prevents the other by concealment from
acquiring material information13 or unless the parties occupy a fiduciary
relationship which imposes a duty of disclosure.
II. THE EXPRESS CIVIL LIABILITY PRovISIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The year 1933 tokens the first significant milestone in the law of
American securities legislation. In the Securities Act of 1933, the Congress
inaugurated a complex, comprehensive system for the registration and
issuance of securities through the use of the mails or facilities of inter-
state commerce. In order to carry out more fully its goal of protecting the
public from misleading statements and material omissions in the sale of
securities, Congress blended the elaborate registration requirements with
provisions for the imposition of civil and criminal liability upon persons
selling securities in violation of the Act. In order to place the provisions
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in their proper per-
spective, a brief glimpse of the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act
will prove worthwhile.
Civil liability under the 1933 Act may arise under three sections of
the statute. Section 1114 permits the purchaser of a security that has
been registered under the Act to sue the issuer and certain other desig-
nated individuals for an untrue statement of a material fact or for an
omission to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary to
prevent the statements in the registration statement from being mislead-
ing. By its express language, section 11 provides a remedy to "any person
acquiring such security" and is not limited to those persons in direct
privity of contact with the issuer, provided the purchaser had no knowl-
edge of the untruth or omission at the time of his acquisition of the
security. A right of action may also be predicated on reliance by the pur-
chaser upon an earnings statement covering a one-year period after the
effective date of the registration statement, if the plaintiff purchased his
shares after the issuance of the statement. Persons other than the issuer
who are otherwise liable under section 11 may exonerate themselves if
they can sustain the burden of proving that they had no knowledge of
the facts which constituted the alleged violations. Moreover, under
section 11 and "any other section of this title," the trial court is vested
with discretion to require that the plaintiff furnish an undertaking for
12. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941) (common law
deceit action, in which misleading statements in a prospectus were allegedly made).
13. See RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 550 (1934).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
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the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees." Finally, a
purchaser may sue under section 11 either at law or in equity, in any
court of competent jurisdiction, and the defendants may be held jointly
and severally liable.' 6
Section 1217 imposes civil liability on two classes of sellers: those
who sell unregistered securities in violation of section 5, and those who
sell securities whether or not they are required to be registered by means
of a prospectus or oral communication containing an untruth or an
omission to state a material fact. The seller may defend by showing
that the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission or that the seller
did not know and could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have
known of the untrue statement or omission. However, the defendant's
liability extends only to the person who purchased the securities directly
from him; in short, privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant is required.
Both sections 11 and 12 are governed by the relatively short statute
of limitations furnished by section 13.18 Thus, an injured purchaser must
bring his action within one year after discovering the untrue statement
or omission, but in no event may he bring the action if more than three
years have elapsed since the offer or sale occurred.
Section 17(a)' 9 declares that "it shall be unlawful" for any person
who offers or sells securities by use of the mails or facilities of interstate
commerce to employ any device or scheme to defraud, to make an untrue
statement or omit to state a material fact, or to engage in transactions
or practices which operate as a fraud on any purchaser. Although section
17(a) simply proscribes certain conduct as "unlawful," it has been con-
strued by some courts as furnishing an implied civil remedy for the
defrauded purchaser of securities."
At this juncture, it should be apparent that all three sections of the
Securities Act providing either an express or implied civil right of action
offer relief exclusively to the injured purchaser of securities. Aware of
the fact that persons might just as easily be defrauded into selling secu-
rities, Congress sought to bring sellers into a position of equality with
defrauded purchasers through the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Thus, section 9(a)2 of the 1934 Act declares it unlawful
for "any person" to engage in certain defined manipulative practices with
respect to securities listed on a national exchange. By virtue of section
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1958).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1958).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
20. Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962) (dictum); Os-
borne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1958).
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9(e),22 defrauded purchasers and sellers may bring a civil action against
any person willfully participating in conduct proscribed by section 9 (a).
As mentioned, however, the protection does not extend to transactions
in unlisted securities, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover only if he
can demonstrate that the price at which he purchased or sold was "affected
by" the defendant's manipulation. Furthermore, in such actions the
court is vested with discretion to require an undertaking by the plain-
tiff for costs and attorney's fees, as under the 1933 Act.2" Finally, unlike
most of the other civil liability sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
transactions in securities exempted from the registration requirements of
the Securities Act are excluded from civil liability under section 9.24
Section 1525 extends civil liability to brokers and dealers who carry
out fraudulent purchases and sales of unlisted securities by the means of
the mails or facilities of interstate commerce.
Section 16(b) provides that certain corporate "insiders" are liable
for short-swing profits realized from any purchase and sale or sale and
purchase of any equity security of an issuer whose stock is listed on a
national exchange.2 6 However, recovery inures to the corporation rather
than to the individual shareholder, creating a kind of statutory derivative
action.
Finally, the Exchange Act includes a potentially comprehensive anti-
fraud provision, section 10(b),27 which declares unlawful manipulative or
deceptive devices "in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
When viewed as an integrated body of securities regulation, it was
soon apparent that the 1933 and 1934 Acts still failed to provide equal
protection to defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities. While the
express civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act, fortified by the implied
protection embodied in section 17(a), afforded virtually complete pro-
tection to the defrauded purchaser, the defrauded seller was left vulner-
able in a number of critical areas. Thus, although section 9(e) provided a
civil right of action to both buyers and sellers injured by manipulative
practices, the burden imposed on the plaintiff was almost unbearable'
which may explain why so few actions have been brought under that
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958).
23. The trial court is further authorized to assess reasonable costs, including reason-
able attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
24. In one notable exception, § 12(2) of the Securities Act expressly exempts securities
of a governmental issuer from the scope of its civil liability.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1958).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958), as amended by 78 Stat. 565 (1964), to apply to cer-
tain over-the-counter companies as well.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
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section.28 Although section 15(c)(1) and the rules promulgated there-
under extend protection to buyers and sellers alike, the fraud must be
perpetrated by brokers or dealers, and then only with respect to securities
sold in the over-the-counter market. And, as noted previously; the
recovery provided by section 16(b) for short-swing profits inures to the
corporation and not to the injured shareholder.
From the midst of this patchwork quilt of sellers' protection emerged
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5, now designated
simply as Rule 10b-5. Although the contours of section 10(b) were
extremely broad, it was not self-executing and required the adoption of
rules by the Commission. Pursuant to the congressional delegation of
authority, on May 21, 1942, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5,29 which reads
as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
At first glance, Rule 10b-5 seems to have been lifted verbatim from
section 17 (a) of the Securities Act. In both cases, the same acts, practices,
schemes and misrepresentations are declared unlawful. However, whereas
section 17(a) applies only to unlawful acts by persons who offer or sell
securities, Rule 10b-5 extends to "any person" who "directly or indirectly"
engages in certain proscribed conduct "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." Thus, in one broad stroke of the administrative
pen-a stroke admittedly shortened by the availability of section 17(a)
as a model-the Commission ventured to extend to the defrauded seller
the wide protection it previously had afforded only the purchaser under
the 1933 Act. With scarcely more than 110 words, the Commission at-
tempted to plug the gaping holes in sellers' protection which remained
after the express liability provisions of the Exchange Act had been
28. See 2 Loss, SEcURrris REGULATION 1034 (2d ed. 1961).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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enacted. There is little reason to doubt that this was the Commission's
intention, for on the same day that the rule was announced, the Commis-
sion declared:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to
brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in protec-
tions against fraud administered by the Commission by pro-
hibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase .... 10
Despite the broad language of the new rule and the so-called "loop-
holes" it purported to close, the argument that Rule 10b-5 had at last
equalized the treatment of buyers and sellers under the federal acts was
less than convincing. Although the admittedly objectionable activities of
securities purchasers were declared "unlawful," no express civil right of
action was mentioned in the rule, as the buyer had been afforded by
virtue of the 1933 Act and as a few limited classes of buyers and sellers
had been granted under the 1934 Act. The protection the seller had
awaited for eight years had arrived, but it seemed to be an illusory one
at best.
III. THE Kardon DOCTRINE: THE GENESIS
OF A CIVIL RIGHT OF ACTION
In 1946, the courts were called upon for the first time to consider
whether Rule 10b-5 could be relied on as the basis for a private right of
action. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,"' the Slavin brothers, who
owned one-half of the stock of the Western Board and Paper Company,
entered into a contract on behalf of the corporation for the sale of its
assets to the National Gypsum Company for one and one-half million
dollars. A short time later, the Slavins entered into another contract with
the Kardons, the remaining shareholders of Western, to purchase the
Kardons' stock in that company for 504,000 dollars. No mention of the
contract with National Gypsum was made at any time, and at the closing,
when the plaintiffs inquired whether any such contract had been executed,
the Slavins answered in the negative. The plaintiffs brought a civil action
under Rule lOb-5 and the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
that Rule 10b-5 did not encompass the plaintiffs' cause of action. The
court denied the defendants' motion and permitted recovery under two
alternative theories: the statutory tort doctrine and the voidability of
contracts doctrine embodied in section 29 of the Exchange Act. 2
30. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230, at 183-84 (May 21, 1942).
31. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the merits); 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1958).
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As early as 1916, long before the first federal securities legislation,
the United States Supreme Court had recognized that "a disregard of
the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted, the right to recover damages from the party in default is implied
.... ,,a3 This doctrine of statutory torts was recognized by the text writers
even earlier34 and affirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as one year
before the Kardon decision." The doctrine is accepted by the Restate-
ment of Torts,86 which was quoted favorably by the district court in
Kardon.
The defendants pointed to other sections of the Exchange Act which
expressly granted a civil remedy to defrauded sellers, relying on the
maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.87
The court replied:
The argument is not without force. Were the whole question one
of statutory interpretation it might be convincing, but the ques-
tion is only partly such. It is whether an intention can be implied
to deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally,
by virtue of the basic principles of tort law accompanies the
doing of the prohibited act. Where, as here; the whole statute
discloses a broad purpose to regulate securities transactions of
all kinds and, as a part of such regulation, the specific section
in question provides for the elimination of all manipulative or
deceptive methods in such transactions, the construction con-
tended for by the defendants may not be adopted. In other
words, in view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere
omission of an express provision for civil liability is not suffi-
cient to negative what the general law implies.38
Realizing that the court was willing to imply a civil remedy by use
of the statutory tort doctrine, the defendants attempted to escape liability
by arguing that the plaintiffs were not within the class of persons, "inves-
tors," that Congress had intended to protect by section 10(b). Judge
Kirkpatrick countered, "I cannot agree, however, that 'investors' is
limited to persons who are about to invest in a security or that two men
who have acquired ownership of the stock of a corporation are not inves-
tors merely because they own half of the total issue."3 9
33. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
34. 2 COOLEY, TORTS 1408 (3 ed. 1906), quoted in Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe
Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926).
35. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946):
[Wjhere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief.
36. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
37. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1951).




In addition to fashioning an implied civil action out of the statutory
tort doctrine, the court found in the alternative that relief might also
be predicated on section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, which provides that
contracts in violation of any of the provisions of the 1934 Act are void.
Since the Kardon decision in 1946, the doctrine of implied liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been recognized by five federal
circuits40 and ten district courts.4 ' The general principle has been so
widely recognized that in the more recent cases the defendant no longer
bothers to assert in his defense that the seller has no right of action
under section 10(b).
In addition to the arguments set forth by Judge Kirkpatrick in
Kardon, the federal courts have advanced several other reasons to justify
the implication of civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Some courts have looked to the purposes of Congress in enacting the
Exchange Act, particularly the desire to lessen fraudulent practices in the
securities market, arguing that nothing would more effectively deter the
proscribed activities than the availability of a private remedy by the
defrauded purchasers and sellers.42 It has also been urged that, in vesting
jurisdiction in the federal courts to determine violations of the statute and
the rules promulgated thereunder, section 27 of the Exchange Act does
not exclude from the term "violations" a civil suit by a defrauded pur-
chaser or seller.43 One writer has argued that when Congress amended the
1934 Act to provide a three-year statute of limitations for actions brought
under section 15(c)(1), which itself granted no express civil relief, its
action in ignoring section 10(b) demonstrated its recognition that an
implied civil action had always existed under the latter section. 44 It seems
40. Second: Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Smith v.
Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951). Third: Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Slavin v. Ger-
mantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum). Fifth: Hooper v. Mountain
States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d
314 (5th Cir. 1959) (dictum). Eighth: Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962).
Ninth: Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Errion
v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
41. See, for example, the following representative cases from the ten districts: Taylor
v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.
Wis. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.
Ky. 1960); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D.
Del. 1956); Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Mills v. Sarjem
Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F.
Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp.
104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
42. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
43. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
44. Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-JOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950).
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equally plausible, however, that Congress failed to include in its amend-
ment a statute of limitations applicable to section 10(b) simply because
it did not consider a civil right of action to be available thereunder.
IV. THE BUYER'S RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER RULE 10b-5
The coincidence of a number of factors made the implication of a
private right of action in favor of sellers under Rule 10b-5 relatively
easy to accept. When one considers the inequality of remedies which were
available to buyers and sellers under the two Acts, along with the policy of
the courts to imply a private remedy for the violation of a statute, it
does not offend one's concept of the separation of powers when a court
implies, as it did in the Kardon case, a right of action not expressly be-
stowed by Congress. However, when the courts are asked to imply a
corresponding right of action in favor of an injured purchaser, serious
difficulties are encountered which are not susceptible of the same facile
solution. In view of the comprehensive express liability provisions in
favor of the purchaser afforded by the two acts, it might be asked why
the purchaser is attracted to Rule 10b-5?
Although the 1933 Act extends relief to the injured purchaser of
securities under a wide variety of circumstances; his remedies are sur-
rounded by a wall of restrictions not mentioned in Rule 10b-5. The most
preclusive of these is the one-and-three year statute of limitations gov-
erning suits brought pursuant to sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act. On the other hand, neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 make
reference to a period of limitation; consequently, the courts are directed
by the conflicts principle which calls for the application of the statute
of limitations of the forum.45 In most cases, this period is five or six years,
or roughly twice as long as the period governing an action brought
under the 1933 Act.
45. In the following cases arising under Rule 10b-5, the federal court expressly applied
the statute of limitations of the forum: Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956)
(Washington 3 year statute); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F.
Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956) (Delaware statute applied, though action was barred by laches);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (Illinois
5 year statute); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (New York 6 year
statute). See also Trussell v. United Underwriters, 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964), where
the district court also applied the forum's borrowing statute.
The difference between the local period of limitations and the short statute under the
1933 Act is widened even further by the fact, as these cases point out, that the state
statute of limitations does not even begin to run until such time as the fraud is discovered.
Under the mandate of § 13 of the Securities Act, the action is barred unless it is brought
within one year after the fraud has been discovered, and in no event may an action be
maintained more than three years after the violation has occurred. Thus, if a plaintiff
discovers the deception four years after it has been perpetrated, his action will be sum-
marily barred by § 13, while he is permitted to maintain his action under Rule 10b-5 until
the tenth year after the violation, assuming the usual six year statute of limitations.
For a comprehensive discussion of the guidelines which govern the federal courts
in such cases, see 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1771-77 (2d ed. 1961). See also Comment,
59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
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Second, the Securities Act of 1933 permits the defendant-seller to
interpose certain affirmative defenses, such as knowledge or the absence
of reliance on the part of the purchaser, while Rule 10b-5 contains no such
provision. Moreover, whereas section 12 of the 1933 Act requires privity
of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, Rule 10b-5 proscribes
certain conduct by "any person" and "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." However, as will be seen later, the requirement
of privity under the rule has not been dispensed with entirely.4" Finally,
the grant of authority to trial judges in cases arising under the Securities
Act to require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking for costs and attor-
ney's fees is nowhere mentioned in section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,
although the same authority has been vested in the trial judge by other
sections of the Exchange Act.
4 7
Thus, as Professor Loss points out, "it is not too surprising . . .
that astute counsel soon attempted to claim for buyers the cultivated
pearl which is the Kardon doctrine."48 As will be seen shortly, the courts
were confronted with considerably more than the mere "application" of
the Kardon principle to purchasers. Forgetting for the moment the more
subtle arguments both for and against the implication of a private action
in favor of purchasers under Rule 10b-5, the problem resolves itself into
the confrontation of two concepts which are as deeply impregnated in
the two acts as they are contradictory. On the one hand, section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 expressly apply to "any person" and not simply to fraud
in the purchase of securities. On the other hand, the 1933 Act had
already bestowed remedies upon the injured security purchaser for a wide
variety of wrongs, while at the same time it had surrounded those
remedies with a well-defined code of procedure. It is obvious; therefore,
that the availability of a private right of action to purchasers under
Rule 10b-5 invites evasion of the limitations imposed on the buyer's right
of action by the express provisions of the Securities Act. If, however, the
purchaser is denied the same unrestricted right of action under the rule
that the seller was given by Kardon, the latter is left in a far more
advantageous position than the purchaser, who was clearly favored over
the seller in the 1933 Act.
Recognizing that the 1933 and 1934 Acts, when viewed together,
pose "certain inescapable anomalies, no matter which of the several
alternative constructions are placed in section 10(b)," 4 the majority of
courts that have considered the problem have permitted the defrauded
buyer a right of action coextensive with that afforded the defrauded seller
of securities by the Kardon and subsequent decisions. Before these
decisions are analyzed, however, it is appropriate to examine the various
46. See section V(C) of this paper's text, infra.
47. Exchange Act §§ 9(e) and 18(a),
48. 3 Loss, SEcURITiEs REGULATION 1780 (2d ed. 1961).
49. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961).
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alternatives available to the courts in seeking to resolve what appears,
in reality, to be a judicially insoluble problem."'
First, a court might deny a private right of action to both purchasers
and sellers alike on the ground that the two acts, both individually and
when viewed as an integrated body of legislation, were drafted too closely
to permit private actions beyond those expressly provided. Although
logically this may be commended as the most uncomplicated way of
resolving the anomalies, as a practical matter it would seem objectionable
on several grounds. For one thing, the Kardon doctrine of implied civil
liability has been so widely accepted in the case of defrauded sellers that
it would be extremely difficult; and more than a little embarrassing, for
the courts to repudiate the elaborate system of rationalizations they
have constructed in support of the rule. Moreover, under such a con-
struction the defrauded seller, who was the principal beneficiary under
Rule 10b-5, would again find himself without an effective remedy, while
the defrauded purchaser would remain fully protected by the 1933 Act.
At the price of logical consistency, the courts would, in effect, be throwing
out the proverbial baby with the bath water. As the Ninth Circuit noted
in Ellis v. Carter,5 solution of the problem by choosing the first alter-
native "seems inconsistent with the all-embracing scope of the legislation
and requires that an unexplained distinction be drawn between buyers
and sellers."52 At the present time, no court has elected to pursue this
alternative.
As a second alternative, the courts might permit sellers alone a right
of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, consistent with the appar-
ent intent of the commission in seeking to close the loopholes which
plagued the sellers' remedies. This alternative appears to have been
chosen by several courts and was the solution reached by the first case
to consider whether the purchaser was entitled to an implied remedy under
Rule 10b-5. In Montague v. Electronic Corp.,53 the plaintiffs sought to
recover for injuries occasioned by false and misleading statements con-
tained in a registration statement filed by the defendant. The plaintiffs'
original complaint alleged that both section 11 of the Securities Act and
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act had been violated. When the defendant
moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to require the plaintiffs to furnish
an undertaking for costs pursuant to section 11, the plaintiffs amended
their complaint to allege a single cause of action under section 10(b).
Recognizing that the Kardon case had permitted a defrauded seller to
maintain an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Judge Coxe
nevertheless refused to extend the principle to the plaintiff-purchasers.
50. See Ellis v. Carter, supra note 49, where the court outlines the four possible aT-
ternatives and the virtues and objectionable features of each choice.
51. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
52. Id. at 273.
53. 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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In urging that neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 were intended to
supplant section 11 of the Securities Act, he pointed out that section 11
related to a limited special subject while section 10(b) was framed in
general language, reasoning that his decision must be governed by the
settled rule of statutory construction that
where there is a special statutory provision affording a remedy
for particular specific cases and where there is also a general
provision which is comprehensive enough to include what is em-
braced in the former, the special provision will prevail over the
general provision, and the latter will be held to apply only to
such cases as are not within the former .... 54
Implicit in Judge Coxe's reasoning, however, is the suggestion that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should not be construed as categorically precluding
a private action by a defrauded purchaser, for as long as no coextensive
remedy is afforded the purchaser under the express provisions of the two
acts, in the proper case Rule 10b-5 might be resorted to in order to close
the loopholes in the mantel of protection surrounding the securities
purchaser.
A short time after the decision in Montague, the same judge who
had permitted a civil action under Rule 10b-5 in Kardon denied the exist-
ence of a corresponding right in the purchaser. In Rosenberg v. Globe
Aircraft Corp.,5 the plaintiff-purchasers alleged, using the phrasing of
Rule 10b-5, that the defendants had employed schemes and devices to
defraud them into purchasing securities. In reality, the alleged untruths
had occurred in the defendant's registration statement. Without deciding
whether a fraudulent registration statement might constitute a special type
of manipulative or deceptive device, the court held that the plaintiff's
cause of action arose exclusively from conduct violative of sections 11.
and 12 of the Securities Act, and consequently the venue provisions of
the 1933 Act would govern the action. Judge Kirkpatrick was unwilling
to consider the possibility that Congress had intended the remedies under
the 1933 Act and section 10(b) to be concurrent:
The two Acts are unquestionably in pari materia and must be
construed together to make a consistent whole. Looking at them
as one statute it is simply not possible that Congress, having
prescribed in elaborate detail procedural requirements which
must be fulfilled in order to enforce civil liability attaching to a
carefully defined type of violation, would have casually nullified
them all in a later section .... No other interpretation can avoid
making a completely incongruous piece of legislation out of the
two statutes in question.5"
54. Id. at 936. Since § 11 of the Securities Act was held to apply to the exclusion of
all other provisions, the court required the plaintiffs to furnish an undertaking for costs
and attorney's fees.
55. 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
56. Id. at 124-25. But see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961), where
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Although the construction given to section 10(b) by the New York
and Pennsylvania district courts is sustainable as a practical means of
solving the problem, it flies in the face of the wording of section 10(b)
itself, which by its terms applied equally to purchasers and sellers.
As a third alternative, it has been suggested that although section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 might be construed as permitting a buyer to sue
thereunder, his right should be subject to the same restrictions which
circumscribe his rights under the 1933 Act. Admittedly, this compromise
avoids the anomaly of providing the purchaser with a less restricted right
than he is given by the 1933 Act; however, on closer inspection it is
obvious that such a compromise in effect gives the defrauded purchaser
no remedy under the 1934 Act, once again raising a distinction between
buyers and sellers contrary to the express language of section 10(b).
Under the fourth alternative, a court might provide the same unre-
stricted right of action under the Exchange Act as sellers were granted
by Kardon. On the grounds of pure simplicity, this alternative would
seem to be the most desirable, for it isolates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
from the express liability provisions of the two acts, and thus avoids the
anomalies which appear when those provisions are considered alongside
Rule 10b-5. In point of fact, most of the cases permitting the purchaser
to sue under Rule 10b-5 have chosen this fourth alternative.
7
In 1949, one year after the New York district court decided the
Montague case adversely to the plaintiff-purchaser, Osborne v. Mallory8
permitted a buyer to recover, notwithstanding the fact that the facts
alleged would have stated a cause of action under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act but for the fact that the short statute of limitations had
run. The action was allowed under the longer New York statute of
limitations, since section 10(b) does not contain any limitations period.
Instead of explaining why the plaintiff should be permitted to finesse the
statute of limitations applicable to section 12, Judge Leibell simply cited
the Kardon case, which, of course, involved an action by a defrauded
seller.59 Ironically, neither the Montague nor the Rosenberg cases were
cited in the Osborne opinion.
The most important case of this period, however, was the Second
Circuit's decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 0° which reversed
the Ninth Circuit, in permitting the purchaser an unrestricted right of action, held that
the most recent enactment-the 1934 Act-should govern.
57. See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fischman v. Ray-
theon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F.
Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co., 187 F.
Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
58. 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
59. The same techniques were employed in Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
60. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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a lower court determination based on Montague and Rosenberg to the
effect that the plaintiff's action would lie only under the 1933 Act. In
Fischman, preferred and common shareholders sued to recover for injury
sustained because of certain false and misleading statements contained
in a registration statement covering the defendant's preferred stock. It
is apparent that the common shareholders would have no cause of action
under section 11 of the Securities Act, since a suit pursuant to that
section may be maintained only by one who purchases securities that
are the direct subject of a prospectus and registration statement. The
trial judge had reasoned that Congress did not intend to afford the
common shareholders a remedy under the 1934 Act for the very conduct
not actionable under the Securities Act of 1933. In reversing the trial
court, Judge Frank explained that in exchange for his freedom from the
restrictions imposed by the Securities Act, the purchaser suing under the
Exchange Act was put to the burden of proving fraud, a requirement not
present in the 1933 Act. Thus viewed, it could not be charged that the
two acts provided concurrent remedies for identical wrongful conduct:61
We think that when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the
1933 Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then that con-
duct becomes actionable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the
Rule, at the suit of any defrauded person, whether or not he
could maintain a suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act.
Taking issue with the defendant's position, Judge Frank cited an
example whereby section 11, which was designed to protect investors
when there is no fraud, would instead afford a shelter to those who
defrauded investors:62
A corporation and its "insiders" put out a prospectus and regis-
tration statement, relating to a very small issue of preferred,
which apparently complies with the provisions of the 1933 Act
but which, as they well know, is false; this they do with the suc-
cessful aim of fraudulently inducing some investors to purchase
the preferred from the company but also other investors to pur-
chase a much larger amount of the company's common from the
"insiders." The fraud-doers would be delighted to reimburse the
purchasers of the small amount of the preferred and to avoid
liability to the defrauded purchasers of the large amount of the
common. If the position taken by the defendants in the instant
case were correct, the defrauded purchasers of the common in
the illustrative case would have no redress whatever under the
statute. This position we think untenable.
It is evident, therefore, that far from viewing the plaintiff's remedies
under Rule 10b-5 and the 1933 Act as concurrent, Judge Frank has
61. Id. at 786-87. However, it is open to question whether the plaintiff is even required
to prove affirmative fraud on the part of the defendant. See section V(B) of this article's
text infra.
62. Id. at 787.
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conceived two separate remedies for two different types of wrongdoing.
His analysis may be justified if the conduct which violates Rule 10b-5 is
that conduct proscribed by clauses (1) and (3), which speak in terms of
fraud. However, the language of clause (2), which relates to untruths,
misstatements and omissions, approaches more closely the language which
defines conduct unlawful under the 1933 Act, and it is open to serious
question whether the violation of clause (2) of the rule requires proof of
fraud. If it does not, then the problem of a coextensive remedy under
Rule 10b-5, free of the restrictions imposed by the Securities Act, reap-
pears as a genuine problem which Judge Frank would be hard pressed
to distinguish away.
Since the Second Circuit's decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., two other circuits63 and a number of district courts64 have elected
the fourth alternative and have recognized the right of a defrauded buyer
to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 free of the restrictions imposed
by the Securities Act. While some courts have been content simply to
cite Kardon and other cases recognizing the seller's right under Rule
10b-5, and then to point to the language of the rule which applies without
reservation to buyers and sellers alike, a few decisions still express a
lingering concern for the anomalies posed when the purchaser is afforded
a free and unfettered right of action. One particular group of cases
demonstrates the manner by which one court has treated the problem.
In four cases arising out of the same factual pattern," purchasers
of bonds issued by a local bridge authority in Nebraska sued under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that they were induced to pur-
chase the bonds by certain untrue and misleading statements contained
in the issuer's prospectus and in a traffic report which painted a glowing
picture of the future revenue of the bridge. The defendants argued that
section 12(2) of the Securities Act, which exempted from liability
transactions in securities issued by a governmental subdivision, was
applicable to the exclusion of all other sections of the two acts. Applying
a rationale similar to that employed by Judge Frank in Fischman, the
court argued that governmental issuers were exempt from liability only for
negligent misrepresentations, which would not be actionable under Rule
10b-5. However, the court went on, the fact that Congress intended to
63. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Boone v. Baugh,
308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v.
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960).
64. See, e.g., Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp. 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962); Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Green-
wich Sav. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp.
683 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Pescia v. Lazar, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. g[ 91,439 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
1964).
65. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp.
370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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exempt such issuers from civil liability for negligent misrepresentations
did not mean that such issuers were meant to escape liability under the
Exchange Act for willful misstatements.66 Although this argument seems
plausible as far as it goes, its vice lies in the fact that it does not go far
enough. Once again the court appears to have ignored fully one-third
of Rule 10b-5, namely, clause (2), which seems broad enough to include
liability for misrepresentations and omissions that are wholly negligent.
Following the court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, section 12 (2) and
not Rule 10b-5 must prevail to sustain the governmental exemption in
situations in which the misrepresentation is not willful. This leads to
the result that although no blanket distinction should be drawn between
buyers and sellers under Rule 10b-5,* nevertheless an even finer distinc-
tion must be drawn within the class of purchasers itself, namely, those
who are wilfully and those who are negligently defrauded-which gives
birth to an anomaly far more difficult to explain.
In retrospect, the root of the dilemma lies not in the use of the words
"any person" in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 but, rather, in the Kardon
decision itself, for once a private remedy is afforded a defrauded seller,
the language of the rule itself compels equal treatment of defrauded
purchasers. Professor Loss suggests that if and when the Supreme Court
considers the question, it would not be surprising if it chose the first of
the four alternatives and overruled the Kardon principle.6 7 His thesis is
predicated on the proposition that Kardon, in freeing the seller of the
restrictions surrounding the buyer under the Securities Act, actually
placed the "step child" of Congress, the seller, in a considerably more
advantageous position than Congress had accorded the "favorite son"
purchaser under the 1933 Act.
Since Professor Loss' words were penned, two important cases have
been decided which cast considerable doubt upon his prognostication.
In Cady, Roberts & Co.,6" the Commission in an administrative proceed-
ing suspended the defendant's trading privileges when it sold securities
without disclosing material information which it knew would be made
public within a matter of minutes. The Commission emphasized that it
could envision no valid reason why securities purchasers should not be
accorded the same protection as given to sellers.69 Admittedly, Cady,
66. In Thiele v. Shields, supra note 65, at 419-20, the court pointed out that even if
the plaintiff's allegations were predicated solely on untruths contained in a prospectus or
oral communication within the municipal bond exemption of § 12(2), a claim under
§§ 17(a) and 10(b)
would still be sustainable if knowing or intentional misrepresentation with regard
to municipal bonds were alleged (and proven) by the plaintiff. That Congress
intended to exempt a seller of municipal bonds from liability for failure to prove
that he exercised reasonable care in investigating the truth of a representation is
not inconsistent with the subjection to civil liability of the same seller after the
purchaser proves that he knowingly misrepresented a fact. (Emphasis added.)
67. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1790 (2d ed. 1961).
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,803 (1961).
69. It is interesting to note that Professor Cary, who as Chairman of the SEC wrote
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Roberts & Co. was not a private action brought by a defrauded pur-
chaser; however; in a footnote the Commission noted that in 1951 it had
struck the narrowing words, "by a purchaser," from the title of Rule
10b-5.7 ' It would be unreasonable to suggest that by changing the title
the Commission intended for the rule to apply to purchasers as well as
sellers only in the case of administrative proceedings, since the Com-
mission must have been aware, in 1951, of those cases which had already
recognized the existence of a private remedy under Rule 10b-5.
The other case, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.," is
especially significant for its broad interpretation of federal securities
legislation and because it was decided by the Supreme Court. In that
case, the Court read into section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act72
a duty of disclosure identical with that appearing expressly in clause
(2) of Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) of the provision even though only
the equivalents of clauses (1) and (3) were included. Although the precise
issue before the Court was the proper construction to be given to the
Advisers Act, this in turn depended on the scope of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act and of securities legislation in general. In construing the
language of the Advisers Act to be commensurate with the policy of
complete investor protection, the Court left no room to doubt that it
will give a construction to Rule 10b-5 that is at least as broad, since the
rule is more nearly identical in terms to section 17(a) than is section
206 of the Advisers Act. Finally, it should be noted that in permitting the
plaintiff to recover in the Capital Gains case, the Supreme Court did
the opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co., suggested in his text that Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), marked the "outer limits" of Rule lOb-5-i.e., the Rule
is broad enough to accommodate a right of action as long as the plaintiff is either a pur-
chaser or seller of a security. BAKER & CARY, CORPORATIONS 574 (3d ed. 1958).
A recent decision seems to have sustained Professor Cary's thesis. In Keers & Co. v.
American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court held that
to be entitled to recover under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must be more than an "aborted"
buyer or seller, i.e., one who but for the defendant's action would have been a buyer or
seller.
On the other hand, in M. L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,408 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1964), the court held, in effect, that
an "aborted" seller could recover under the rule. In that case, the plaintiff and defendant
entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff was to sell its stock to the defendant-under-
writer. The public offering never took place, the failure allegedly caused by the defendant's
lack of diligence. The plaintiff charged that the defendant's promises, assurances and over-
all conduct constituted a course of business which operated as a fraud or deceit. The court
held that even in the absence of a consummated purchase or sale, the plaintiff was en-
titled to maintain an action under Rule 10b-5, on the ground that the Act defined both
"purchase" and "sale" to include contracts to purchase or sell. The court distinguished
Birnbaum on the ground that in that case the plaintiff was not even an intended buyer
or seller.
70. CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. ff 76,803, at p. 81,018 n.22, referring to 16 Fed. Reg. 7928
(1951).
71. 375 U.S. 180 (1963), reversing, 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For an excellent
discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in this case, see Note, 19 U. MIAr i L. REV. 148
(1964).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1958).
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not seem the least troubled by the fact that the section relied on failed
expressly to provide for a private right of action.
V. THE SCOPE OF THE RULE
In addition to the most fundamental question posed by section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5-whether an aggrieved purchaser or seller is permitted to
maintain a civil action in the first instance-various collateral issues have
arisen which the courts have been called upon to decide. In general terms,
these issues concern the extent to which a private remedy may be avail-
able to an injured purchaser or seller.
A. The "Doorstep Rule"
In the earlier cases brought pursuant to Rule lOb-5, an effort was
made by the defendants to limit the scope of the rule to those transactions
which had been effected through the media of a national stock exchange
or organized over-the-counter markets.7" Although it will be recalled that
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. recognized an implied civil remedy when
the alleged fraudulent transaction was conducted face-to-face, that rec-
ognition was purely sub silentio, since the issue was never raised by the
defendants.
The argument that Rule lOb-5 was limited to transactions conducted
by means of a national exchange or organized over-the-counter market
has been predicated on two references in the Exchange Act itself: section
10(b), which delegated authority to the Commission to make such rules
as might be necessary "in the public interest," and section 2,74 which,
in setting forth the purposes of the act, pointed to the necessity for
regulating transactions conducted by means of an exchange or over-the-
counter market. On the other hand, the language of Rule 10b-5 is
extremely broad, referring to transactions effected "by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange." Further, the rule's pro-
scriptions apply expressly to "any security" and not merely to listed
securities or those traded in the organized over-the-counter market.
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,5 the issue was squarely raised by
the defendants, who argued that the statement of purposes contained in
section 2 left no room for doubt that only "public" sales were protected.
Instead of divorcing the specific scope of the rule from the very general
purposes alluded to by the defendants, the court merely defined "over-the-
counter" in such a way that it would be consistent with the recovery per-
mitted in Kardon:
73. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145
(E.D. Pa. 1950).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958).
75. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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An over-the-counter transaction is simply one which does not
utilize the facilities of a securities exchange, but under the unam-
biguous provisions of the Act it covers the sale or purchase
of a security on a doorstep as well as the trading of a profes-
sional securities broker.
To strengthen his decision, the trial judge then pointed to the legislative
history of the Exchange Act, which militated against the narrow con-
struction urged by the defendants.
Another federal district court 78 took the position that although the
preamble of the Act referred to securities traded on a national exchange
or over-the-counter market, such language could be utilized as an aid to
construction only if section 10(b) were ambiguous; which was not the
case. In a footnote, the court defined securities traded over-the-counter
as "those securities not registered on a national exchange which are traded
through a securities broker or with a securities dealer. '79 Thus, even
though the court gave to the term "over-the-counter market" a definition
far more restrictive than the court had done in Speed, nonetheless the
class of transactions within the scope of Rule 10b-5 was held to extend
beyond the over-the-counter market as so defined.
A third district court ° held that Rule 10b-5 was applicable to private
transactions, noting that the Rule referred to "any security" and was not
limited to securities sold on an exchange or through the organized over-
the-counter market. A number of other decisions have recognized the
"doorstep rule," either after having expressly considered the issue8' or
tacitly, by permitting the plaintiff, sub silentio, to maintain an action when
the transaction was purely face-to-face.82
A similar question has been whether the conduct prohibited by Rule
10b-5 must itself be effected by means of the mails, an instrumentality
of interstate commerce or the facilities of a national securities exchange.
The courts have held generally that the fraudulent representations,
schemes or transactions need not be carried out by the mails or interstate
commerce facilities, as long as those facilities are used "in connection
with" the unlawful conduct.8 3 This interpretation clearly is consistent
76. Id. at 830.
77. H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).
78. Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
79. Id. at 148, n.3.
80. Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il1. 1952).
81. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Hooper v. Mountain States
Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1953); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f] 91,459 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
82. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
83. E.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Errion v. Connell, 236
F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp.
954 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
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with the plain language of the rule. However, a recent decision seems to
have required that the mails or facilities of commerce at least be used
before the transaction has been consummated, even though the fraudulent
conduct itself has ceased prior to the use of the mails or interstate facil-
ities.8 4 On the other hand, if the fraudulent activity has ceased but later
the mails are used to remit the purchase price of the securities, the
rule will have been violated. 5
B. The Contours of "Fraud" Under Rule 10b-5
A far more crucial question concerns the scope to be given to the
loose concept of "fraud" embodied in Rule 10b-5. Although clauses (1)
and (3) expressly refer to fraud, no attempt is made to define that term.
Moreover, clause (2) seems to impose no requirement of fraud, and
simply prohibits untrue statements and omissions to state a material fact.
Most courts that have considered the question agree that "fraud"
as used in the first and third clauses of the rule should be given a meaning
broader than common law deceit.8 ' Thus, for example, although the plain-
tiff still carries the burden of proving "fraud," it is doubtful that he is
required to show scienter on the part of the defendant. On the other
hand, reliance by the plaintiff appears to remain necessary.8
84. Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962).
85. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
86. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis
v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d
799 (3d Cir. 1949); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Texas Conti-
nental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Fry v. Schu-
maker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Thus, in Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co., supra at 23, the court
said:
I am of the opinion that it was the intention.of the Congress by this legislation
to give the purchaser of invalid bonds a right to recover without the necessity of
offering proof of deceit and intentional fraud. The statute contemplates a new
right of action for the good-faith purchaser to recover from the seller for con-
structive fraud which grows out of the failure to make a full and complete dis-
closure.
Compare Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), in which the court stated
that Rule lob-5 was more limited than common law fraud, because the use of the mails
or facilities of interstate commerce must also be alleged and proven.
87. Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
CCH FED. SFc. L. REP. 91,467 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1965); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co.,
218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962);
Connelley v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio
& Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
In Kohler v. Kohler, supra at 823, the court remarked:
Certainly it is reasonable to assume that reliance is inherent in the concept of a
breach of duty to disclose material information. If a plaintiff does not rely upon
the data he was furnished, how can he say that the undisclosed data was material
or that the data he was furnished was "in the light of the circumstances" mis-
leading? Absent proof of reliance, there is no liability.
See also Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DE
PAuL L. REV. 71 (1962). Compare Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), in
which reliance was said to be unnecessary in an action under § 9(e) of the Exchange Act.
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However, it is in the area of clause (2) that the full potential of
Rule 10b-5 seems to lurk. Not only is the word "fraud" absent, but
the type of conduct expressly prohibited would not be actionable at the
common law. Although liability may be predicated on an untrue statement
of a material fact, the rule does not, on its face, require scienter on the
part of the defendant or reliance on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, a
wholly negligent misrepresentation would seem to be unlawful. Moreover,
liability based, as in clause (2), upon an omission to state a material fact
was unknown at the common law except in a narrow class of cases.
The second clause of the rule has been instrumental in plugging a
gaping loophole in the protection afforded by the common law. According
to the majority common law rule, the failure of a corporate insider to
disclose material facts prior to his purchase of the corporation's stock
from a shareholder was not actionable. 88 This rule was predicated on the
ground that although an insider owed a fiduciary obligation to deal fairly
with his corporation, he was under no corresponding duty to the share-
holder outside of his duty to refrain from active deception. A minority of
courts applied the so-called "special facts" doctrine, which compelled a
corporate insider with knowledge of special facts not at the disposal of the
ordinary shareholder to disclose such facts prior to purchasing the share-
holder's stock. 9 No doubt it was with a view to the inadequacies of the
common law that clause (2) was included by the Commission when it
adopted Rule 10b-5.
Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 refer expressly to
"insiders," the cases almost without exception have involved such persons.
One case, Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,90 denied recovery under the second
clause of the rule on the ground that the defendants were not "insiders"
and therefore were under no duty to disclose their reasons for seeking
to purchase the plaintiffs' stock. Mills seems to be clearly erroneous. In
the first place, the rule itself imposes the duty to disclose; it does not
require such a duty as a condition of liability. Secondly, Rule 10b-5
88. Thus, in Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 407, 169 N.E. 268, 271 (1929), the court
stated: "The fact that the defendants were directors created no fiduciary relation between
them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his stock."
For a list of authorities supporting the majority common law view, see Goodwin v.
Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
89. The doctrine owes its origin to the following language in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S.
419, 431 (1909) ;
If it were conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that the ordinary relations
between directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a
fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to the shareholder
the general knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of the shares of
the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases where,
by reason of the special facts, such duty exists. (Emphasis added.)
The principle established in Strong v. Repide, supra, has been followed in a number of
cases. See, e.g., Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945); Agatucci v. Corradi,
327 Dl. App. 153, 65 N.E.2d 630 (1945). See also BAKER & CARY, CORPPORAYONs 558-63
(3d ed. 1958).
90. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
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expressly prohibits the designated conduct by "any person," and not when
performed by "insiders" alone. Third, when it was intended that liability
be restricted to insiders, that intention was carried out by specific pro-
visions to that effect, as in section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Moreover,
the decision in Mills is self-contradictory, for it refers to an insider's
duty to disclose which, except under the minority "special facts" doctrine,
was imposed for the first time by the rule itself.9 ' Perhaps in the back
of the court's mind was the belief that the second clause of Rule 10b-5 was
simply the codification of the "special facts" doctrine, which admittedly
applied only in the case of the corporate insider. However, in view of the
unfettered language of clause (2), and of the entire rule for that matter,
such a theory is wholly untenable.
The case which has been most significant in marking the contours of
the prohibitory language of Rule 10b-5 is the Commission's decision in
Cady, Roberts & Co. 2 There; a broker received information from the
directors of the Curtis Wright Company that the board had met and
decided to reduce the dividend rate on the company's stock. Although
the information had been relayed for public distribution, the defendant
broker sold a number of shares for discretionary accounts and sold short
other shares, all prior to the time when the new dividend policy became
a matter of public knowledge. Although the defendant knew at the time
of the transactions that the information was not yet public, it failed to
disclose to the purchasers the company's decision to reduce the dividend
rate. The Commission brought an action to suspend the broker's trading
privileges pursuant to section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5.
These provisions, said the Commission, were "broad remedial provisions
aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they
are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for
fraud and deceit."9 The Commission went on to add that the anti-fraud
provisions "are not intended as a specification of particular acts or prac-
tices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass
91. Thus, in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), the
court unequivocally declared:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to
purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affect-
ing the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside
position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which.information
would have affected the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from
the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take
unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to pro-
vide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority
may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction.
Defendant's contention that only express misrepresentations or half-truths are un-
lawful fails to look at the fact that an implied misrepresentation is just as fraud-
ulent as an express one and constitutes an untrue statement of a material fact within
the meaning of the governing rule.
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,803 (1961).
93. Id. at p. 81,015.
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the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken
of investors and others."94
Finally, the Commission declared the relationship between the three
clauses of section 17 (a) and Rule 10b-5 to be mutually supporting rather
than mutually exclusive. Thus, a breach of the duty to disclose might
result in the violation of all three parts of the rule and of section 17(a). 5
In this connection, it was determined that the defendant's failure to dis-
close the dividend information constituted a practice which operated as
a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers, in violation of the third clause. 6
Although the Commission found it unnecessary, therefore, to decide the
scope of the other two clauses, it is inconceivable that future decisions
would undertake to impose a more narrow construction on those clauses,
especially in view of the fact that Cady, Roberts & Co. incorporates into
the concept of fraud itself, at least in clause (3), a duty of disclosure
which was virtually nonexistent at the common law.
C. Privity and Reliance
Next to the question of whether Rule 10b-5 furnishes an unrestricted
private right of action to defrauded buyers and sellers of securities, the
most significant issue before the courts today concerns the question of
whether privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant is neces-
sary. It will be recalled that strict privity between the parties was not
required in the common law action of deceit, and that section 11 of the
Securities Act imposes no such prerequisite. Only section 12 (2), pursuant
to which the defendant is held "liable to the person purchasing such
security from him," seems to be delimited by the requirement of privity.
The first suggestion that the court-implied right of action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 might be circumscribed by a privity limita-
tion arose in a 1951 decision of the Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of New York. In Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp.,"7 the directors of the defendant corporation published false state-
ments concerning the financial condition of the company in order to induce
others to purchase shares of stock owned by them. The defendants sold
their shares directly to unknown third persons; some twelve days after
the last share was sold by any of the defendants, the plaintiffs purchased
94. Id. at p. 81,016.
95. The duty of disclosure seems to have been broadened in the recent case of List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 91,467 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1965). There the
court held that even when there was a total nondisclosure, as where the parties had never
communicated with each other, the Exchange Act would still be violated. To hold contrary,
the court added, would automatically exempt many impersonal transactions contrary to the
intent of Congress, as expressed by § 2 of the Act.
96. But see Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. f 91,443
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1964), which stated that an impending stock dividend was not such a
material fact as would make nondisclosure actionable under Rule 10b-5.
97. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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a number of shares through a national exchange. When the true facts
were known, the price of the stock fell and the plaintiffs sold their shares
at a loss. In denying the right of the plaintiffs to maintain an action, the
trial judge declared:
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of
the security in connection with which the improper act, practice
or course of business was invoked seems to be requisite and it
is entirely lacking here.9'
Precisely what the court had in mind when it referred to a "semblance of
privity" is not entirely clear. In granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint, Judge Sugarman suggested that an additional allegation of
reliance, "coupled with the possibility that later sales by the individual
defendants may form the basis of privity with these plaintiffs dictates
that a fair opportunity to explore such prospects should be accorded be-
fore the plaintiffs' claims are conclusively snuffed out." 9 This statement
indicates that if strict privity is not required, then at least some degree of
reliance upon the false statements will be required. For reasons not
explained-perhaps because the plaintiffs were unable to allege that they
had relied on the untrue financial statements-the plaintiffs chose to
appeal rather than to amend their complaint as suggested by the trial
court. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.'0° Of signifi-
cance, however, is Judge Frank's dissent, in which he indicated that
reliance may constitute a satisfactory substitute for, or at least a "sem-
blance of," privity. He distinguished Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,101
in which the complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff was neither a
purchaser nor seller, noting that Birnbaum could not be construed so as
to demand privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. In this in-
stance, Judge Frank was undoubtedly correct, for although it would seem
that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 demands that the plaintiff be at least a
defrauded purchaser or seller, it does not compel a finding that the parties
must occupy a relationship of privity of contract.10 2
It is interesting to note that neither the lower court nor the Second
Circuit made mention of Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,"°3 where, it will
be recalled, the plaintiffs had purchased common stock on the open market
in reliance upon false statements in a registration statement covering the
defendant's preferred stock. Unless the silence of the court in Farnsworth
98. Id. at 706.
99. Id. at 706-707.
100. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
101. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
102. But see Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955), where the
court denied recovery in the absence of privity, citing Birnbaum as authority.
For an excellent criticism of the lower court decision in Farnsworth, see Comment, 4
STAN. L. REV. 308 (1952), from which Judge Frank quoted at length in his dissent in the
Farnsworth appeal.
103. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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is taken to express its satisfaction that the element of reliance present in
Fischman served as a "semblance of privity," there may be reason to
doubt the validity, in the Second Circuit, of the earlier decision.
Notwithstanding the Farnsworth case, the privity issue is still far
from settled. In all but a few cases, strict privity of contract was in fact
present and, consequently, the issue was not raised. °4 In other cases,
although the facts seem to indicate that the plaintiff and defendant did
not deal directly with each other, the absence of privity was not determin-
ative because there existed another ground for denying the plaintiff's
claim.1 5 Ironically, although the most recent decision under Rule 10b-5
permitted recovery even though from the facts it is clear that privity was
lacking, the Farnsworth case was cited favorably. 6
No court has faced the privity issue so squarely as did the Kentucky
district court in Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co. °7
There, the plaintiff purchased shares of stock after the defendant had sold
to intervening parties in the open market. In meeting head-on the defend-
ant's argument that the plaintiff was barred by the absence of privity, the
court stated: o8
The court is of the opinion that such a fact is not material under
the statute. Rule X-10b-5 admits of no such loophole but on the
contrary speaks of the duties and obligations of the seller. It is
common knowledge that there is frequently lack of privity of
contract between a bonding house handling an issue of bonds
and the ultimate investor. One of the purposes of the legislation
was to prevent an imposition upon the public by individuals and
corporations whose business was dealing in securities and who
had training, knowledge and experience in the practical processes
of a bond issue and the property and potential back of it.
The remaining cases which have dealt with the privity issue reside
between the two poles that are the Farnsworth and Texas Continental
decisions. Thus, in Buchholtz v. Renard,'0 9 the same court that required
a semblance of privity in Farnsworth relented to some extent when, in a
situation involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants, it held it unneces-
sary for the plaintiffs to allege specifically which defendants had sold to
104. E.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Hooper v. Mountain
States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
105. Thus, for example, in Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), although the court noted that no "semblance of privity" was present, the observation
was interjected as an afterthought. Earlier, the court had noted that the plaintiff purchased
his stock prior to the defendant's alleged misrepresentation, thereby destroying the possibility
of reliance as a substitute for privity.
106. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
107. 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
108. Id. at 24.
109. 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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which plaintiffs. Farnsworth was distinguished on the ground that there
the defendants had not sold directly to any of the plaintiffs but, rather, to
third persons. Clearly, the distinction is a valid one, and the defendants'
objection that privity was absent seems to be stretching an already tenuous
argument to the breaking point. However, the court was not content to
rest with that observation: Farnsworth was distinguished still further,
namely, on the ground that there the defendants had sold their last
share almost two weeks before the plaintiffs had purchased their first
share. Within this kernal of dictum lie a couple of interesting possibilities.
First, assuming that the plaintiffs in a given case are unable to allege that
they had relied on the defendants' false statements (as they were appar-
ently unable to do in Farnsworth), will "privity" or some semblance
thereof nevertheless be found to exist as long as the plaintiffs can demon-
strate that they were buying and the defendants were selling at the same
time, even though not to each other? Second, assuming, on the other
hand, that the defendants had sold their last share prior to the first
purchase by the plaintiffs, will "privity" be found to exist if the inter-
vening period is not too great? Buchholtz indicates that a period of twelve
days, the time involved in Farnsworth, is too long, but will a shorter
period suffice? These are interesting questions which the dictum in
Buchholtz did not consider-if, indeed, the court even realized that such
questions were imbedded in its seemingly innocuous statement.
Most of the courts that have been faced with the privity issue have
been content to take the easy way out by accepting reliance as a satis-
factory substitute for strict privity of contract, consistent with the dictum
in Farnsworth."° One decision, however, seems to have come to grips with
the question in a rather novel manner. In Cochran v. Channing,"' al-
though the parties were not in privity it is clear that the plaintiff would
not have sold his stock had the defendants disclosed certain material
information concerning the company's reduction of its dividend rate. In
short, reliance was present even though strict privity of contract was not.
Citing a previous decision in which privity was raised in connection with
a different statute," 2 privity was held not to be a condition precedent
to the plaintiff's right to maintain the action but, rather, was viewed as
simply one element of proof to be considered along with other factors.
Ironically (in view of the broadly remedial interpretation it has given to
the rule), the Commission, in dicta, has seemed to favor the existence of
privity as a condition of civil liability under Rule 10b-5, although the
absence of privity will not defeat the availability of administrative sanc-
tions under the rule."'
110. E.g., Greenwich Sav. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (by
implication).
111. 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
112. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
113. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1 76,803 (1961).
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The preoccupation of the courts with the privity question seems to
be unfortunate. Far from referring to privity in affirmative terms, both
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 impose liability on "any person . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Moreover, both
section 10(b) and the rule are expressly applicable to exchange transac-
tions which, by their very nature, often place the purchaser or seller of
securities in a position several steps removed from the origin of the
fraudulent representations on which he relies. The same conclusion would
seem to follow from the fact that the specified activity is unlawful
whether "directly or indirectly" conducted.
It is difficult to believe that Congress, especially in view of the legis-
lative history of section 10(b)," 4 intended by using such comprehensive
language to impose a requirement of privity between the parties. More-
over, it was the purpose of the Exchange Act to expand the common law
liability for fraud in securities transactions. When it is remembered that
even at the common law privity was not a necessary element in an action
for deceit, it seems illogical to require it under the statute, which was
intended to provide a more liberal remedy than under the common law.
At the same time, however, it does not seem unreasonable to demand some
sort of reliance on the part of the plaintiff." 5
D. The Texas Gulf Sulphur Litigation
At the present time, a further test of the elastic qualities of Rule
10b-5 appears to be in the making. Recently, the Commission brought
civil proceedings against thirteen officers, directors and employees of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, accusing them of making use of inside
information concerning the company's Canadian ore strike to trade in
Texas Gulf stock before the news of the discovery was made public. In
its complaint for injunctive relief, the Commission has charged that the
company and the individuals named as defendants "have engaged, are
engaged, and are about to engage, in acts and practices which constitute
and will constitute violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ...and of Rule 10b-5 . . . .""' In addition, a number of
private suits have already been initiated by former shareholders who
sold their stock in the corporation in ignorance of the company's ore dis-
114. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934):
Experience with State laws designed to prevent the exploitation of the investor by
supervision of the sale of securities has demonstrated the inadequacy of criminal
penalties as the sole sanction. Customers are ordinarily reluctant to resort to criminal
proceedings and in the absence of complaints by them, the discovery of violations is
often impossible. Furthermore, if an investor has suffered loss by reason of illicit
practices, it is equitable that he should be allowed to recover damages from the
guilty party. (Emphasis added.)
115. See 3 Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 1766 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, 4 STAN. L. REV.
308 (1952).




covery, and some of these actions have been consolidated on the ground
that they involve substantially the same issues of law and fact.
117
The facts alleged in the pending litigation present an almost classic
case of Rule 10b-5 violations." 8 On or about November 8, 1963, the
company commenced exploratory test drilling in the vicinity of Timmins,
Ontario, and by November 12, an initial hole was completed which showed
the presence of high grade ores. According to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, immediately after visual inspection of the drill core by the
company's geologist, steps were taken to disguise the discovery. The drill
rig was moved to another site, trees were planted in the test hole and
a worthless core was left nearby. On the other hand, officials of the
company urge that the concealment of the rich strike was effectuated for
the purpose of enabling the company to purchase additional land sur-
rounding the small tract owned by the company where the ore was
discovered.
Notwithstanding the tight security precautions, which apparently
endured long enough to enable the company to purchase the desired land
in the vicinity, news began to filter out concerning the ore discovery and
widespread rumors began to be circulated, followed by frantic speculation
in mining shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In an effort to quell
the rumors and allegedly for the purpose of complying with the New
York Stock Exchange requirement of prompt clarification in such situ-
ations, on April 12, 1964, the company issued a press release which labeled
the rumors "premature and probably misleading." On April 15, the
analyses of other test drillings were completed, which showed that the
optimism connected with the initial findings was well-founded. The
company called a press conference for the following morning, at which
time the news media were told that the company had made a "major
discovery" which preliminary data indicated consisted of 25 million tons
of ore."'
The Commission has charged that between November 12, 1963,
shortly after the strike was discovered and its potential appreciated by
the company, and April 16, 1964, when the news was made public, the
thirteen individual defendants purchased in the open market an aggregate
of 9,100 Texas Gulf shares, bought "calls" on 5,200 shares and were
voted options to purchase 31,200 shares at a price of approximately 24
dollars per share. In this connection, it is interesting to note that on
117. Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1965, p. 4, col. 3.
118. This statement of the facts has been compiled from the Commission's allegations
in its Complaint for Injunction, supra note 114, and from news articles in the Wall Street
Journal appearing on the following dates: April 20, 1965, p. 3, col. 1; April 21, 1965, p. 4,
col. 3; April 23, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
119. Later estimates predicated on more complete information placed the probable body
of ore in the vicinity of 60 million tons of high grade copper, zinc, silver, and lead, worth
an estimated $2 billion. Life Magazine, August 6, 1965, p. 29.
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November 11" 1963, the stock was selling for about 17 dollars per share,
while on April 16, 1964, the price had risen to 37 dollars and by the
end of the month was up to 58 dollars per share. On April 19, 1965-
the date the SEC filed its suit-Texas Gulf Sulphur reached its highest
level, closing at 71 dollars per share. 2 °
Although the litigation is still only in the preliminary stages, a few
observations are relevant and some interesting issues may be raised. First,
it seems clear that section 10(b) encompasses the type of violations
allegedly committed by the defendants. Moreover, the language in Cady,
Roberts & Co. 2 1 to the effect that the three clauses in Rule 10b-5 are
mutually supporting seems to be justified by the facts involved here. It is
clear that, at the time the stock was purchased by the defendants, infor-
mation concerning the ore discovery was not communicated to the persons
who sold their stock, thereby violating clause (2) of the rule. The press
release of April 12, 1964, to the extent that it was false or misleading,
would lie well within the proscription of the second clause as well.
Finally, the designed concealment of the ore discovery, the elaborate
steps taken to camouflage the strike; along with the continuous purchase
of shares by the defendants during that period is easily susceptible of
characterization as a device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or, in the
alternative, as an action or practice which would operate as a fraud or
deceit in violation of the first and third clauses of the rule.
Another interesting issue concerns the need for privity between the
individual defendants and the injured sellers. It is clear from the Commis-
sion's opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co. that privity should be immaterial
in an action brought by the Commission. 22 However, private litigation is
also pending which may be thwarted by the fact that most, if not all,
of the shares sold were purchased by the defendants on the open market.
At this time, the degree of reliance on the part of the selling shareholders
is not known, but as suggested earlier,' 23 reliance would appear to be an
acceptable substitute for privity between the parties.
It should be noted that although Rule 10b-5 does not prescribe any
specific remedies for violation of its provisions, the civil remedies which
have been granted for its violation include recision and restitution, dam-
ages and injunctive relief.124 Although the Commission has not yet re-
leased a full outline of the liability that the company may face, its com-
120. Thereafter, news of the SEC's action caused Texas Gulf stock to lose ground,
reaching its low of 49 on June 28. However, by January 19, 1966-nine months after the
Commission filed its suit-the stock closed at 90Y8 reflecting investor confidence in both
the company and those at its helm.
121. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 76,803 (1961).
122. Id. at ff 81,019: "The absence of a remedy by the private litigant because of lack
of privity does not absolve an insider from responsibility for fraudulent conduct."
123. See section V(C) of this paper's text supra.
124. See generally, 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION Ch. 11C (2d ed. 1961).
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plaint has asked the court to do the following: (1) permanently enjoin
the defendants from making further use of inside information in buying
and selling Texas Gulf stock; (2) order ten of the defendants to offer
rescission to the sellers; (3) order one of the defendants not only to make
restitution to those who sold their stock to him, but also to persons who
sold to friends of the defendant who purchased pursuant to his recom-
mendations; (4) order five of the defendants to cancel existing options
to purchase shares and to return all profits or shares obtained from the
exercise of stock options already granted; (5) order the company to
refrain from making further untrue statements concerning its activities;
and (6) order such other general relief as the court may deem appro-
priate.
12 5
It is apparent that if the court grants the relief requested, the power
of the Commission will be significantly enlarged; indeed; the executive
vice-president of Texas Gulf Sulphur has criticized the Commission for
attempting to make a test case that will enable it to strengthen its policing
powers and to prompt legislation which would effectively forbid an insider
from purchasing stock in his company. 26 Whatever may be the motives of
the Commission, it seems clear that the enforcement powers of the
Commission sought to be exercised go far beyond anything known at the
present time. For one thing, although a defrauded investor is entitled to
demand restitution from a purchaser under Rule 10b-5, the power of the
Commission in an administrative proceeding to order restitution is open
to serious doubt. And when, as here, the Commission as plaintiff in a civil
action before the courts prays that restitution be ordered in favor of
persons who are not even parties to the litigation, the remedy strikes one
as being even more unorthodox. Indeed, it is debatable whether a court
of equity is vested with power in such a case to compel the defendants to
make restitution to persons who not only have not been made parties
plaintiff in the litigation but, in addition, who have not been identified
by the Commission. 2 ' Even if such a remedy were properly within the
power of a court of equity to grant, how will the individual recipients of
restitution be ascertained? In view of these procedural difficulties, it
would not be surprising if the court were to find that the relief requested
by the Commission is better suited to the various private actions currently
pending before the courts.
125. Complaint for Injunction, supra note 114, at 33-35.
126. Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
127. In United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956), a similar question
was presented when the Food and Drug Administration sought to enjoin violations of
§ 301(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. As additional relief, the FDA sought to
compel restitution to persons who had expended money on a sexual rejuvenant sold by the
defendants in violation of the Act. The court held that the statute in question did not confer
upon the courts jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for and that the so-called "general
powers of equity" could not be relied on to justify the creation of remedies not authorized
by the statute.
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On the other hand, it may be argued that the relief sought by the
Commission, though unorthodox and difficult of enforcement, comports
with the fundamental policy of protecting the investor and the public
interest-a policy which is spelled out by the Exchange Act in general
and by section 10(b) in particular. It is submitted, however, that although
this policy may be relied on to justify the pursuit of remedies within the
framework of jurisdiction patently established by Congress, it does not
follow that the extent of rights conferred by Congress can be extended in
the name only of a broad statement of policy with nothing more to
justify it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The perplexing difficulties of interpretation which have seemed to
follow Rule 10b-5 at virtually every turn may be blamed, for the most
part, on the imprecision in wording of the rule itself; especially when it
is viewed in the light of the specific language of the express liability
provisions of the two acts. It is submitted that this state of affairs is
attributable more to the fact that the Commission failed to appreciate
the rule's potential than to the fact that in adopting the rule it attempted
to cure too much with too little. It is true that section 17(a) of the
Securities Act is no more commendable by way of precision; however, so
far it has been Rule 10b-5 and not section 17(a) which has been utilized
to extend the boundaries of civil liability. Indeed, the irony of Rule 10b-5
lies in the fact that the arsenal of private remedies has been expanded so
greatly by only a few words, and by words which, at that, do not even
refer to civil relief. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that this expan-
sion owes its existence to an administrative rule rather than to an act
of Congress. Despite the fact that the constitutionality of Rule 10b-5
has been upheld as a valid exercise by the Commission of the rule-making
authority delegated to it by Congress,128 it is still questionable whether
Congress intended section 10(b), as implemented by the rule, to be
employed as a means of nullifying many of its own express enactments.
If, as has been suggested,129 the Supreme Court is disposed to uphold
the judicial extension of liability under Rule 10b-5, in the absence of a
comprehensive reappraisal by the Congress the anomalies associated with
the rule seem destined to persist. It is entirely within the realm of possi-
bility that, given a liberal construction, Rule 10b-5 would be broad
enough to encompass every type of violation presently cognizable under
the express provisions of the two acts, while at the same time it would
avoid the built-in restrictions and limitations contained in those provi-
sions. Thus, for example, by the simple process of "characterization,"
a false or misleading registration statement, actionable under section 11
128. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).




of the Securities Act, might be held to constitute a "scheme, or artifice to
defraud" or an "untrue statement of a material fact" within Rule 10b-5.
Similarly, an unlawful proxy solicitation violative of section 14 of the
Exchange Act, might constitute a practice which would operate as a fraud
or deceit under the rule. 180
As plaintiffs' attorneys become increasingly more inventive in finding
new uses of Rule 10b-5, the burden imposed upon the courts to preserve
the federal acts as an integrated body of securities regulation will become
correspondingly more weighty. The fact that Congress was content to
let the Commission provide remedies for problems which the latter was
better able to foresee does not justify the conclusion that Congress
intended that its express enactments be rendered superfluous. The
language of Rule 10b-5, no matter how unfettered it may appear on
its face, nevertheless must be interpreted with a view to the probable
intent of Congress in delegating authority to the Commission, namely, to
mend the loopholes in investor protection and not to reweave an entirely
new fabric.
130. But see Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1963), wherein the
court refused to consider whether misleading proxy material might, under any circumstances,
constitute a manipulative and deceptive device within the prohibition of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, remarking that "only sheer speculation can bring the provisions of 10(b) into play."
Borak was cited favorably in Barnett v. Anaconda Co., CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 91,502
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1965). Compare Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., CCH FED. Sac. L.
REP,. fT 91,445 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1964), which suggested that a false prospectus might
constitute a device to defraud within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.
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